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1B 1297

Florida Houst vf Representatives - 1979
By Representative s Reynolds, Fontana and others
A bill to be entitled
An act relating to campaigns; amending s.
99.012 (2), Florida Statutes, defining

"appcintive office" for provisions prohibiting
certain elected or appointed officeholders from
seeking candidate qualification unless they
resign their current office; providing an
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
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Section 1.

Subsection (2) of section 99.012, Florida

Statutes, is amended to read:
99.012

Restrictions on individuals qualifying for

public office.-(2)

No individual may qualify as a candidate for

17

public office who holds another elective or appointive office,

18

whether state, county or municipal, the term of which or any

19
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part thereof runs concurrently with the term of office for

20

which he seeks to qualify without resigning from such office

0
U4--

21

not less than 10 days prior to the first day of qualifying for

�

22

the office he intends to seek. Said resignation shall be

,._

23

effective not later than the date upon which he would assume

24

office, if elected to the office to which he seeks to qualify,

25

the expiration date of the term of the office which he

26

presently holds, or the general election day at which his

27

successor is elected, whichever occurs earliest.

28

purposes of this section the term "appointive office" shall be

29

limited to directors of state, county, or municipal agencies,

30

and shall not include subordinate personnel, deputy sheriffs

31

or police officers or any individual whose term of employment
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109-29-3-9
is governed by a public employee labor agreement.
2

5

With

2.13/6

regard to elective offices, said resignation shall create a

2.13/7

vacancy in said office thereby permitting persons to qualify

2.13/8

as candidates for nomination and election to that office in

2. 13/9

the same manner as if the term of such public officer were
otherwise sc heduled to expire; or, in regard to elective

2.13/10

municipal or home rule charter county offices, said

2.13/11

resignation shall create a vacancy which may be filled for the

2.13/12

unexpired term of the resigned officer in such manner as
10

provided in the municipal or county charter. This does not

11

apply to political party offices.

12

Section 2.

This act shall take effect October 1, 1979.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21

BOUSE SUMMI\RY

With respect to provisions prohibiting an elected or
appointed official from seeking candidate qualification
for an office without resigning his present office,
limits the term "appointive office" to directors of
state, county or municipal agencies. Specifies that the
term shall not apply to subordinate personnel, deputy
sheriffs, police officers or individuals governed by a
public employee labor agreement.

22
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24
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26
27
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ADDENDUM TO HB 1297
HB 1297 was reported favorably out of Committee on 4/27/79
(HJ 386) and was debated and amended on the House floor on
5/21-22/79. A technical Amendment #1 and a Title amendment
#2 were offered by the Committee and adopted on the floor
( HJ 648-649). A third amendment was offered by Rep. Haben to
uxumpL subordjnate personnel, deputy sheriffs, and poljce
officers from the resign-to-run requirements, unless such a
person was running as a candidate against the person who has
the authority to hire or promote that individual. The
amendment failed by a voice vote (HJ 649). Amendment #4
by Rep. Bush required anyone not mandated to resign to take a
leave of absence during the campaign (HJ 649 ). An amendment
to the amendment was offered by Rep. Danson to require these
individuals to take such a leave of absence without pay during
the campaign. After numerous procedural votes, the amendment
to the amendment was adopted by a vote of 55-44 and the
amendment was adopted by a vote of 54-46 (HJ 649). Amendment
#5 was offered by Reps. Watt and T. F. Lewis to strike every
thing after the enacting clause. The amendment failed by a
vote of 47 to 55 (HJ 649-650). Amendment #6 was offered by
Rep. Melby to include deputy sheriffs in the definition of
"appointive office" and exclude subordinate personnel. The
amendment failed by a voice vote (HJ 650). A motion was
offered to reconsider Amendment #3 which was adopted and the
bill carried over for second reading (HJ 650).
On third reading Amendment #7, a Title amendment, was offered
by the Rules and Calendar Committee which was adopted by a
voice vote (HJ 663). As a result of the adoption of #3,
Amendment #4 as amended was of no effect, since Amendment #3
strick everything after the enacting clause which had then
included that amendment. Amendment #8 (identical to Amendment
#4 and the amendment to the amendment) was offered by Reps.
Bush and Danson. It required anyone not mandated to resign
to take a leave of absence without pay during the campaign.
The amendment failed by a voice vote (HJ 663). The question
recurred on the adoption of the bill and the bill failed by
a vote of 43-69 (HJ 663). A motion was made by Rep. Nuckolls
to reconsider the vote by which the bill failed. Rep. Watt
moved to lay the motion on the table which failed by a vote
oJ 5:3-GO (IIJ 663). The qucsUon recurred on the motion to
reconsider and the vote was 63-50 (HJ 663). Rep. L. J. Smith
moved to reconsider the vote by which Amendment #8 failed and
after being reconsidered the amendment was adopted by the
required two-thirds vote (92-20) (HJ 663-664). The question
recurred on the passage of HB 1297 and the bill passed by a
vote of 56-55 (HJ 664).
The bill was certified to the Senate and upon receipt there
was referred to the Judiciary-Civil Committee (SJ 539). On
5/31/79 the bill was withdrawn from that Committee and placed
on the Senate Calendar (SJ 734). It passed the Senate by a
:Hi-� Vtll,<, <lll nj"l/7:l (S,T 82n).
The companion bill, SB 973 by Sen. Barron, which was
identical to the original version of HB 1297, passed the
Senate (35-1, SJ 485), was received in the House and placed
on the calendar (HJ 640), where it died upon conclusion of the
regular session on June 6th.
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COMMITTEE ON ETHICS & ELECTIONS
HB 1297
SPONSORS:

OTHER COMMITTEES OF REFERENCE:
Reynolds, Fontana,
and Others

RELATING TO:

Resign-to-run law

None
COMPANION/SIMILAR: __
H_B_l_9_0____

April 13, 1979
I.

Summary

A. Present Situation: Section 99.012, F.S., known as the resign-to
run law, requires all public officers (elective or appointive) who seek
to qualify for nomination or election to another public office, to resign
10 days prior to the first day of qualifying, if the term of the office for
which he seeks runs concurrently with the term of office for which he
presently holds. It does not apply to appointive officials serving without
salary. There are attorney general opinions and court decisions which
have interpreted this statute to apply to police officers (appointive
officer).
B. Probable Effect of Proposed Changes: HB 1297 defines the term
"appointive office" and limits it to directors of state, county, or
municipal agencies and excludes subordinate personnel, deputy sheriffs,
police officers or individuals governed by a public employee labor agree
ment.
II.
III.

Fiscal Impact:

None

Comments:

Previous legislation: HB 190 by Rep. Liberti and Silver was reported
favorably out of the Ethics & Elections Committee at its 3/6/79 meeting.
An amendment was adopted to exclude police officers from the resign-torun law.
It has long been established in this state that the term public
office "embraces the idea of tenure, duration, and duties in exercising
some portion of the sovereign power, conferred or defined by law, and not
by contract." State ex. rel. Holloway v. Sheats, 38 So. 508 (Fla. 1919).
A law enforcement officer (deputy sheriff or police officer) is
exercising sovereign powers of the state jn that his duties are extensions
of the sheriff's duties, including the power to arrest.
In a recent court decision, the circuit court in Leon County found
the resign-to-run law to apply to law enforcement officers of a munici
pality (Reynolds v. Singleton, No. 78-1480, 2d Cir. 1978). This case is
presently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
This decision followed earlier attorney general opinions. A
deputy sheriff was found to be an "officer" within the meaning of its
usage in s. 99.012. Such being the case, a deputy sheriff must comply
with the resign-to-run law before being a candidate for or holding another
public office. Op. Atty. Gen. Fla. 077-89 (August 30, 1977). A part
time police officer, certified by the poljce standards and training
commission, was found to be an "officer" within the purview of the dual
In order
office prohibition of Art. 2, s. 1 of the State Constitution.
to serve on a city council (in the facts of this opinion) he must comply
with the resign-to-run law. Op. Atty. Gen. Fla. 077-63 (June 29, 1977).
(Copies of opinions attached).
The preamble to Chapter 70-80 (Resign-to-Run Law) expresses the
legislative intent of the law as follows:

" ...it is generally agreed to be considered inequitable to permit
an elected official or appointive official holding office to use the
prestige and power of that office in seeking election to a higher or
different office, and ... it is generally agreed that by providing for
prospective resignations the people of the State of Florida would not be
compelled to bear unnecessary cost of special elections occasioned by
elected or appointed officials who, while holding one office, seek and
obtain another elective office."
The resign-to-run law was upheld as being constitutional by the state
supreme court shortly after its enactment. Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 401
(Fla. 1970).
In 1971 the Legislature placed an exemption in the "resign-to-run
law" which exempted a person "who serves as a member of an appointive board
or authority without salary" from the resignation requirements of the
st.at.11l.0. s. 00.012(!')), 17 .S. S11bs0q11c,nLly, th0 /\Ltorncy G<:n<:ral issurd
an opinion, Op. Atty. Gen. Fla. 071-43, stating that members of advisory
councils, appointed by the governor and acting in a purely advisory
capacity, were not public "officials" within ttie dual-office prohibition
of the constitution. Article II, s. 5, Fla. Const.
Staff recommends that the underlined language be placed in
subsection (5) of s. 99.012, F.S. That section presently addresses the
applicability of the law to appointive officials.
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The Honorable R. Dale Patchett
Florida House of Representatives
Post Office Box 2380
Vero Beach, Florida 32960
Re:

House Bill 1297

Dear Representative Patchett:
This is in response to an inquiry from your office as to
the intent and application of the provisions of House Bill 1297
which passed both houses of the Legislature during the 1979
regular session. To date no action has been taken by the
Governor regarding this bill, so it is not law at this time.
A copy of the enrolled bill is attached._
House Bill 1297 w as introduced by Rep. Reynolds so as to
amend the application of Florida's resign-to-run law to police
officers and deputy sheriffs. That law reads as follows:
"(2) No individual may qualify as a candidate for
public office who holds another elective o� appointive
office, whether state, 'county or municipal, the term
of which or any part thereof runs concurrently with
the term of office for which he seeks to qualify with
out resigning from such office not less than 10 days
prior to the first day of qualifying for the office
he intends to seek. Said resignation shall be ef
fective not later than the date upon which he would
assume office, if elected to the office to wbich he
seeks to qualify, the expiration date of th� term
of the office which he presently holds, or the general
election day at which his successor is elected, which
ever occurs earliest. With regard to elective offices,

The Honorable R. Dale Patchett
June 21, 1979
Page two

said resignation shall create a vacancy in said office
thereby permitting persons to qualify as candidates
for nomination and election to t��t office in the
same manner as if the term of such public officer were
otherwise scheduled to expire; or, in regard to elective
municipal or home rule charter county offices, said
resignation shall create a vacancy which may be filled
for the unexpired term of the resigned officer in such
manner as provided in the municipal or county charter.
This does not apply to political party offices.
(3)
Any incumbent public officer whose term of office
or any part thereof runs concurrently to the term of
office for which he seeks to qualify shall resign his
office pursuant to the provisions of this section and
shall execute an instrument in writing directed, ex
cept as provided below, to the governor, irrevocably
resigning from the office he currently occupies. The
resignation shall be presented to the governor with
a copy to the Department of State except that, in
the case of a county or municipal public officer, the
resignation shall be directed and presen�ed to the
officer with whom he qualified for the office from
which he is resigning, or, in the case of an appointed
official, to the officer or authority by whom he was
appointed to the office from which he is resigning,
with a copy to the governor and to the Department of
State. The resignation shall become effective and
shall have the effect of creating a vacancy in office
as provided herein, and the public officer shall continue
to serve until his successor is elected or the vacancy
otherwise filled as provided in subsection (2)."
s. 99.012, F.S. (1977).

Exceptions have been provided for candidates for.federal office,
s. 99.012(4), F.S. (1977), Stack v. Adams, 315 F.Supp. 1295 (N.D.
Fla. 1970), and those individuals serving without salary on an
appointive body. s. 99.012(5), F.S. (1977).
Relying upon long-standing precedent of the Florida Supreme
Court, in 1977 the Attorney General opined that police officers
and deputy sheriffs were "officers", not employees, and were
therefore subject to the resign-to-run law. Op. Atty. Gen. Fla.
077-63 (June 29, 1977) and 077-89 (August 30, 1977). The
Division of Elections had previously reached a similar conclusion
the previous year. DE 076-4 (July 13, 1976).

The Honorable R. Dale Patchett
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The authority for finding such law enforcement personnel to
be officers rather than employees is the state supreme court
decision of Curry v. Hammond, 154 Fl�. 63, 16 So.2d 523 (1944).
It was there stated:
"It can hardly be questioned that a patrolman on a
city police force is clothed with a soverign power of
the city while discharging his duty . . . True, he is
an employee of the city but he is also an officer.
It is the character of duty performed that must de
termine his status."
The same conclusion was reached for deputy sheriffs in Blackburn v.
Brorein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1954).
Based on these court decisions (though not expressly ruling
on the resign-to-run law which was not enacted until 1970) and
the previously cited opinions the Division of Elections advised
candidates who were law enforcement officers of the requirement
that they resign. This led to the first. direct judicial assault
on this position in 1978 when Mr. Reynolds filed suit in Leon
County seeking to overturn the division's decision. Reynolds v.
Singleton, No. 78-1480 (2d Cir. 1978). Relying on the Curry de
cision, Judge Joanos found a police officer to be an "officer"
within the meaning of s. 99.012(2), F.S. (1977)., and therefore
found the resign-to-run requirement applicable.
Mr. Reynolds complied with the decision, resigned, and was
subsequently elected to the House.
As originally filed, HB 1297 carved out a total exception
from the resign-to-run law for "subordinate personnel, deputy
sheriffs or police officers or any individual whose term of
employment is governed by a collective bargaining agreement."
The reference to subordinate personnel was unnecessary as only
"officers," i.e., those cloaked with the soverign power of the
state, are subject to resign-to-run. The bill was approved in
this version by the Ethics and Elections Committee and placed
on the calendar.

The Honorable R. Dale Patchett
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On the floor of the House, after extensive debate, an
amendment by Rep. Haben was adopted which constitutes the current
text of the enrolled bill. It is my understanding of the intent
as embodied in the language of the amendment and as stated on
the House floor that the blanket exemption of the original bill
Instead, the amendment precluded resignation by
was too broad.
a law enforcement officer unless he/she was running against his/
her boss. For example, a deputy sheriff would only be required
to resign when he was a candidate for sheriff and the incumbent
sheriff was running for reelection.

-

A proviso was added for all other situations in which a
law enforcement officer was a candidate for public office. In
the event he is a candidate for some other offic�, or is a
candidate for his boss's job for which the incumbent is not
seeking reelection, he need not resign, but must take a leave
of absence without pay "during the period in which he is seeking
election to public office." An individual who is not an officer,
but merely an employee, is not required to resign or take a leave
of absence pursuant to the resign-to-run law. The proviso is
applicable only to those individuals not required to resign as
a result of the remainder of the subsection.
It should be noted that certain counties or municipalities
may through civil service or personnel regulations require em
ployees or officers to resign when seeking elected office. Such
requirements are not affected by the resign-to-run law. There
fore, the exception from resignation will not supersede such a
local ordinance or regulation.
I hope the foregoing answers any questions you may have re
garding the intent of the bill as amended. Also, in the event
I've misstated the intent copies have been. sent to the sponsor
of the bill and the amendment so they may make any necessary
corrections.
Sincerely,

✓�

_7:>
p
David

E. Cardwell
Staff Director

DEC/rnb
Attachment
cc:

Rep. Haben Cw/Attachment)
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STATE OF FLORIDA
{ju
DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAiM

•

ROBERT L. SHEVIN
Attorney General

June 29, 1977
077-63
The Honorable Clyde King
Council President
City of Edgewood
Post Office Box 13274
Orlando, Florida 32809
Re:

PUBLIC OFFICERS--DUAL OFFICE HOLDING--Resign-to-Run
Law--Certified reserve police officer is officer
within purview of constitutional prohibition against
dual office holding and cannot simultaneously serve
as council member; charter provision prohibiting
candidates for city council from serving as appointive
officer may operate to create a vacancy in office of
reserve police officer when such officer qualifies
as candidate for city council.
§99.012(2), F.S.;
Art. II, §S(a), State Const.; Art. III, §§3.06 and
3.07, Charter (1975) of City of Edgewood.

Dear Mr. King:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on substan
tially the following questions:
(1) MAY AN ELECTED CITY COUNCIL MEMBER,
OR CANDIDATE FOR THAT OFFICE, ALSO SERVE
AS A CERTIFIED RESERVE POLICE OFFICER
UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND FLORIDA
STATUTES?
(2) DOES THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF
EDGEWOOD PROHIBIT THE ABOVE-STATED ACTIVITY?

The Honorable Clyde King
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Accord, Paquin v. City of Lighthouse Point, 330 So.2d 866
(Fla. 4 D.C.A. 1976); Maudsley v. City of North Lauderdale,
300 So.2d 304 (Fla. 4 D.C.A. 1974). The powers which a
police officer may exercise, particularly the authority to
arrest without a warrant, and not the salary or certification
requirements, determine that a police officer is an "officer."
Maudsley, supra; cf. State ex rel. Gibbs v. Martens, 141 Fla.
66, 193 So. 835, 837 (1940), in which the court held that a
probation officer was an "officer" since he had the right to
arrest without a warrant for "no right is more sacred or
more jealously guarded than the one that liberty will not
be infringed except by due process of law."
Your inquiry is, however, directed to those police officers
who serve part time without compensation. See §943.10(4),
F.S., which defines "part-time" or "auxiliary" police officers
as persons who are "employed, with or without compensation,
less than full time by the state or any political subdivision
or municipality thereof, whose primary responsibility is the
prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the
penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state." The Police
Standards and Training Commission of the Department of Crim
inal Law Enforcement is charged with the responsibility of
establishing uniform minimum standards for the employment and
training of these officers, §943.12(2), F.S., and the issuance
of certificates of compliance to those persons satisfactorily
completing or complying with the prescribed training program,
§943.14, F.S. No person may be employed as a part-time or
auxiliary police officer until he has obtained such a certifi
cate of compliance with certain exceptions not material to
the present inquiry. If the part-time or auxiliary police
reserves of a municipality fail to meet the requirements of
§§943.12 - 943.14, F.S., and the rules and regulations of the
Police Standards and Training Commission, their authority to
act and function as auxiliary police officers is limited and
their power to arrest is no greater than that of a private
citizen. See AGO 073-398; cf. AGO 073-14. It is assumed for
the purposes of this inquiry that a "certified reserve police
officer" referred to in your letter has satisfied the require
ments set by the Police Standards and Training Commission.
Such an officer may carry arms and exercise the power of arrest.
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the position of "certified
reserve police officer" constitutes an "office" within the
purview of Art. II, §5(a), State Const.; therefore, the simul
taneous service of an individual as a reserve or auxiliary

077-63

The Honorable Clyde King
Page Four

police officer and as a city council member violates the
prohibition against dual office holding contained in the fore
going constitutional provision.
You also inquire as to whether a candidate for the office of
city council member may serve as "certified reserve police
officer." Section 99.012(2), F.S., Florida's Resign-to-Run
Law, provides in pertinent part:
No individual may qualify as a candidate
for public office who holds another
elective or appointive office, whether
state, county or municipal, the term of
�hich or any part thereof runs concurrently
with the term of office for which he seeks
to qualify without resigning from such
office not less than 10 days prior to the
first day of qualifying for the office he
intends to seek . . . . (e.s.)
The foregoing statutory provision requires that an officer
resign at the time and in the manner prescribed in §99.012,
F.S., only when his present term for elective or appointive
office, or any part thereof, would run concurrently with or
overlap the term of the office for which he seeks to qualify.
Such resignation becomes effective at that time and has the
effect of creating a vacancy in the office of police officer,
as provided in the statutes, but the officer may continue to
serve until such time as his successor is appointed and quali
fied on or following the effective date of the resignation as
specified in §99.021, F.S. Cf. AGO's 075-67, 074-210, 072-203,
072-201. But see Art. III, §3.07, City Charter (1975) of the
City of Edgewood which prohibits any candidate for elective
office of council member or Mayor, subsequent to qualifying,
from serving as a salaried or nonsalaried appointive official
in the City. Thus, the provisions contained in §99.021, F.S.,
may not be applicable to your inquiry since §3.07 of the City
Charter appears to create a vacancy in the office of "certified
reserve police officer" at a point in time earlier than that
required by §99.021. See question two, infra, for a further
discussion of the impact of this charter provision.
If the office of "certified
definite term fixed by law,
office is held for the term
the will or pleasure of the

reserve police officer" has no
under the common-law rule "the
of the appointing power, or at
authority which conferred it,

The Honorable Clyde King
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provided the term so conferred does not extend beyond that
of the appointing power." 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§497, p. 936; 67 C.J.S. Officers §46, p. 200; cf. State ex
rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 184 So. 1, 6 (Fla. 1938); 67 c:-:I.s.
Officers, p. 196 (officer removable at pleasure of appointing
power has no "term" of office). Even if an officer serves
without a fixed term, "he will be able to use the prestige and
power of his office in seeking election to another office and •
the spirit and intent of the law, if not its letter, dictate
that such an official should comply with the resign-to-run law."
AGO 072-203.
"Whether a public officer has a fixed term of office can be
determined only by reference to the law creating the office
State ex rel. Gibbs, supra, at 6. The revised city charter
(1975) is silent as to the appointment of part-time reserve or
auxiliary police officers; however, it does provide for the
appointment of the Police Chief by the city council, Art. IV,
§406. The Chief of Police serves until just cause for replace
ment and is charged with the responsibility of administering
"the working hours, assignments, training, performance, etc.,
of the regular members of the Poli!ce Department, the Reserves,
and the Dispatchers." Art. IV, §4.06A. Thus, it appears that
the Chief of Police is the appointing power for the reserves
with regard to the Resign-to-Run Law, and, accordingly, the
term of office for a member of the reserves coincides with
that of the Chief of Police. Therefore, it appears that a·
reserve police officer should resign his office under the
terms of §99.012, F.S., as his tenure of office, which is the
same as that of the Chief of Police, would not ordinarily
expire until after the date he would assume the position of
city council member, if elected. Accordingly, for purposes
of the Resign-to-Run Law, a reserve police officer seeking
the office of council member should resign, effective as of
the date upon which the duties of the new office would be
assumed. AGO 072-203. But see, Art. III, §3.07 of the city
charter (1975), infra.
QUESTION TWO

Your second question is directed to the effect the provisions
contained in the city charter have on a "certified reserve
police officer" also serving as city council member or as a
candidate for that position. Under Art. III, §3.06, of the
present charter,
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No Council member or Mayor may hold two
(2) elective offices, whether such offices
are Federal, State, County or Municipal.
Any City Council member or Mayor upon
formally qualifying for any elected office
other than the Mayor's or City Council
member's office in the City of Edgewood,
such office, Mayor or City Council member,
shall become vacated or be filled as pro
vided herein this Charter. (e.s.)
The prohibition against dual office holding contained in this
section of the charter is applicable only when two elective
officers are involved. Council members are elected to the
city council under Art. III, §3.01 of the charter. Thus, the
charter's prohibition against dual office holding would be•
applicable to your inquiry only if the office of "certified
reserve police officer" is an elected office. It should be
noted, however, that Art. II, §S(a), of the·Florida Constitu
tion does not distinguish between elective and appointive
officers. The constitutional prohibition against dual office
holding is, therefore, applicable to city council members and
police officers whether they are elected or appointed.
The city charter also provides that "[n]o· candidate for elected
office of Council member or Mayor shall, subsequent to qualifying,
serve as a salaried or nonsalaried appointed official in the
City of Edgewood." Art. III, §3.07, Charter (1975). Therefore,
a "certified reserve police officer," as an appointive officer
of the city, who qualifies as a candidate for the office of
council member or Mayor, is prohibited from serving as a reserve
police officer and, by operation of the city charter, may well
have, in legal effect, vacated his appointive office. The pro
hibition contained in Art. III, §3.07 of the Charter appears to
create such a vacancy; however, the section is not self executing.
See In Re Advisory Opinions to the Governor, 76 Fla. 417, 79 So.
874 (1918), in which the court stated that when a person holding
one office is appointed to and accepts another office, such
appointment and acceptance vacates the person's right and status
to the first office. Cf. Holley v·. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla.
1970) (acceptance of incompatible office by one already holding
office operates as resignation of first). Accordingly, to
avoid conflict, a reserve police officer who intends to run for
the office of council member should resign his position as police
officer. Cf. AGO 072-203.
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Therefore, until legislatively or judicially settled, I am of
the view that a certified reserve police officer should resign
his office upon qualifying as a candidate for the city council.
QUESTION THREE
You also inquire as to the effect of the charter provision,
Art. III, §3.07, on present or "sitting" council members. As
council members are elected pursuant to Art. III, §3.01, and,
as discussed under question one, may not simultaneously serve
as a reserve or auxiliary police officer, section 3.07 in
terms would not operate on any such "sitting" council members.
However, a "sitting" council raember who is a candidate for
reelection or is a candidate for the office of Mayor is also
prohibited from serving as a salaried or non�salaried appointed
official (including a reserve or auxiliary police officer) of
the city.
Your question is answered accordingly.
S U M M A R Y
Part-time auxiliary or reserve police officer, certified'by
the Police Standards and Training Commission, is an "officer"
within the purview of constitutional prohibition against dual
office holding and, therefore, may not simultaneously serve
as a city council member. Such an officer whose term runs
concurrently with that of Chief of Police, who serves until
just cause for replacement, should resign his office under
the Resign-to-Run Law effective as of the date upon which the
duties of the office of council member would be assumed.
The prohibition against dual office holding contained in the
City of Edgewood charter is applicable only when two elective
offices are involved. The city charter provision prohibiting a
candidate for the office of council member or Mayor from
serving as a salaried or nonsalaried appointed official of
the city may operate to create a vacancy in the office of
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reserve police officer when such officer qualifies as a candi
date for council member. Since the charter provision is not
self executing, a reserve police officer should resign his
office upon qualifying as a candidate for the city council or
for Mayor.
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The Honorable J. Love Hutchinson
Supervisor of Elections
Office of the Supervisor of Elections
Gadsden County
32351
Quincy, Florida
Re:

DEPUTY SHERIFFS--DUAL OFFICE HOLDING-
RESIGN-TO-RUN LAW--Deputy sheriff may not
serve simultaneously as mayor; deputy sheriff
should resign his office if his tenure of
office would not ordinarily expire until after
the date upon which he would assume the new
office, if elected. Art. II, §S(a), State
Const., §§30.07; 99.012, F.S.

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on sub
stantially the following questions:
(1) MAY A DEPUTY SHERIFF SERVE SIMULTA
NEOUSLY AS MAYOR OF A MUNICIPALITY WHERE
SUCH MAYOR RECEIVES NO COMPENSATION FOR
HIS SERVICES?
SHOULD A DEPUTY SHERIFF RESIGN TO
(2)
RUN FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR?
QUESTION ONE

Your first question is answered in the negative.
Article II, §S(a), State Const., provides, in pertinent part,
that "[n]o person shall hold at the same time more than one
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office under the government of the state and the counties and
municipalities therein." It is clear that a mayor is a munici
pal officer, notwithstanding the fact that he serves without
compensation. As to whether or not a deputy sheriff is also
an officer, the courts have answered this question in the
affirmative. See Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla.
1954), holding that deputy sheriffs are "officers" rather than
"employees"; and see Parker v. Hill, 72 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1954)
and Johnson v. Wilson, 336 so:2d 651 (1 DCA Fla. 1976), which
reach the same conclusion. Cf. State v. Hurlbert, 20 So.2d
693 (Fla. 1945), holding that a statute authorizing a board
of county commissioners to employ a county detective to be
appointed by the Governor, and vesting such detective with the
same powers of arrest and of summoning witnesses in behalf of
the state in criminal cases as sheriffs, created an office and
not an employment; and Curry v. Hammond, 16 So.2d 523 (Fla.
1944), in which the Supreme Court stated that a city patrolman
was "clothed with the sovereign power of the city while dis
charging his duty"; and that therefore such patrolman was an
officer of the city; Pacquin v. City of Lighthouse Point, 330
So.2d 866 (4 DCA Fla. 1976); Maudsley v. City of North
Lauderdale, 300 So.2d 304 (4 DCA Fla. 1974); State ex rel.
Gibbs v. Martens, 193 So. 835 (Fla. 1940); AGO's 069-2; 077-63.
In AGO 071-167, this office ruled that-a deputy sheriff is
precluded by the terms of Art. II, §5(a), State Const. from
also serving as a county commissioner. The conclusion reached
therein applies with equal force to your inquiry; and, there
fore, a deputy sheriff may not serve simultaneously as mayor.
QUESTION TWO
Your second question is answered in the affirmative.
The Resign-to-Run Law, §99.012(2), F.S., provides in pertinent
part:
No individual may qualify as a candidate for
public office who holds another elective or
appointive office, whether state, county or
municipal, the term of which or any part
thereof runs concurrently with the term of
office for which he seeks to qualify without
resigning from such office not less than
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10 days prior to the first day of qualify
ing for the office he intends to seek. . . .
The above-quoted statutory provision requires that an officer
resign only when his present term for elective or appointive
office would run concurrently with or overlap the term of
office for which he seeks to qualify. AGO's 075-67, 074-210,
072-203. With respect to deputy sheriffs, §30.07, F.S.,
authorizes the sheriff to appoint deputy sheriffs who shall
have the same power as the sheriff appointing them. See also
§30.53, F.S., providing that the "independence of the sheriffs
shall be preserved concerning . . • the hiring, firing and
setting of salaries of . . . personnel." Thus, it is clear
that deputy sheriffs have no fixed term of office; they are
"mere appointees of the sheriff without tenure of office and
removable at the will of the appointing power . . . ." AGO
073-91. In the absence of a definite term fixed by la�, under
the common law rule "the office is held for the term of the
appointing power, oi at the will or pleasure of the authority
which conferred it provided that the term so conferred does
not extend beyond that of the appointing power." 62 C.J.S.,
Municipal Corporations, §497, p. 936; cf., State v. Hurlbert,
supra, holding that a statute creating the office of county
detective to be f�lled by appointment by the Governor, though
it did not fix the term of such office but was entirely silent
on the matter, did not violate constitutional provisions pro
hibiting the creation of any office, the term of which shall
exceed four years, since it is presumed that the Legislature
enacted the statute with such constitutional limitations in
mind and intended a constitutional result; and, that, therefore,
the statute was to be construed as though it provided for a
term of four years. Thus, the term of office of a deputy
sheriff coincides with that of the sheriff who appointed him.
Under such circumstances, even in the absence of a fixed term
of office, a deputy sheriff should resign pursuant to §99.012,
F.S., if his tenure of office, which is the same as that of
the sheriff, would not ordinarily expire until after the date
he would assume the office of mayor, if elected. See AGO
072-203, in which it was stated that even though an officer
serves without fixed term, "he will be able to use the pres
tige and power of his office in seeking election to another
office and the spirit and intent of the law, if not its letter,
dictate that such an official should comply with the resign
to-run law." See also DE 076-04, in which the Division of
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E lections advised that deputy sheriffs "ought to comply with
§99.012, F.S Q "

SUMM ARY

A deputy sheriff is an "officer"; and is,therefore, prohibited
from simultaneousl y serving as mayor of a municipal ity. If
the term of office of deputy sheriff, which coincides with
that of the sheriff who appointed him, would not ordinarily
expire unti l after the date upon which he would assume the
duties of the new office, if elected, the deputy sheriff
should comply•with the resign-to-run law.
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Mrs. Betty Castor, Director
Division of Elections
Department of State
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Re:

ELECTIONS--RESIGN-TO-RUN LAIJ--subordinate nersonnel
defined; school teachers, applicability to\ leave
of absence to begin on the day on which a candidate
qualifies for the new office to which he seeks to
be elected. §99.012, F.S.; Ch. 79-391, Laws of
Florida.

Dear Mrs. Castor:
This is in resronse to your request for an opinion on substan
tially the following questions:
(1) HOW SHOULD THE TERM "SUBORDIHATE
PERSONNEL," AS USED IN CH. 79-391, LAHS
OF FLORIDA, AN ACT RELATING TO CAMPAIGNS,
EXEl1PTHJG CERTAIN PERSONS FROM THE
RESIGN-70-RUN REQUIRE?1ENT, BE DEFINED?
DOES THIS i\HEl1Dt1Ei.'1T TO §99. 012, F.S.,
RE0UIRE A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER TO
RESIGN IF HE OR SHE BECOtffiS A CANDIDATE
FOR EITHER SCHOOL SUPEIUNTENDEUT OR THE
DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD?
(2)

(J) IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION (2) IS IN
THE UEGATIVE, MUST THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHER TAKE A LEAVE OF ABSEUCE?
(4) SHOULD THE LEAVE OF ABSEnCE OF
COVERED OFFICERS BEGi:N ON THE DATE THE
CANDIDATE QUALIFIES UNDER CH. 99, F.S.,
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OR THE DATE HE OR SHE BECOMES A CANDIDATE
PURSUANT TO §97.012(18), F.S.?
Florida's Resign-to-Run Law is said to serve t�o purposes: to
prevent an officeholder from using the power and prestige of one
office to seek another, and to spare the taxpayer the expense of
having to finance a special election when an incumbent office
holder is elected to another office and is, therefore, compelled
to resign from the one he or she currently holds� See the
preaElble to Ch. 70-80, Laws of Florida. It accomplishes these
purposes by requiring any person who holds an elective or appoint
ive office and who seeks to be elected to another public office,
the te� of which overlaps or runs· concurrently with the term
of the office which he currently holds, to submit an irrevocable
letter of prospective resignation prior to qualifying for election,
which resignation shall be �ffective regardless of whether the
candidate is elected to such office. Section 99. 012 (2), (3),
F.S. A copy of the prospective resignation is presented to the
Depart□ent of State, but othen1ise your office has no responsi
bilities or duties imposed by the law itself. See State ex rel.
Shevin v. Stone, 279 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1972).
In your letter to me, you indicate that your office has received
several inquiries concerning the meaning of the recent a□endment
to the Resign-to-Run Law, Ch. 79-391, Laws of.Florida. It is
these inquiries that have prompted you to seek my opinion as to
the above questions. Cf. §106.23(2), F.S. Because of the extent
of the controversy surrounding this amendment, as well as the
importance of the law itself, it is appropriate that I exercise
my authority to issue my legal opinion on these matters.
Chapter 79-391, Laws of Florida, about which you inquire, amends
§99.012, F.S., by providing a new subsection (7) which reads:'
For the purpose of this section no indi
vidual who is a subordinate oersonnel,
· deputy sheriff, or police o�ticer need
resign pursuant to subsection (2) or (3)
unle�s such individual is seeking to
qualify for a public office which is
currently held by an individual who has
the authority to appoint, e□ploy, promote,
or otherwise supervise that subordinate
personnel, deputy sheriff, or police
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officer and who has qualified as a .candi
date for reelection to that public office,
provided that any such personnel, deputy
sheriff, police officer or other such
individual shall take a leave of a�32nce
without pay from his eoployr!lent during
the eriod in which he is seekin elec
tion to public o ice.
e.s.
QUESTION ONE

In your first question, you inquire how the term "subordinate
personnel," as used in the above-quoted amendment to Ch. 99,
F.S., should be defined. That term is not used any other place
in the Election Code, and I have not been able to find any
reference to or definition of it in the Florida Statutes. Neither
am I aware of any judicial decisions defining that tem. Conse
quently, any comments I make are without benefit of precedent
and necessarily are subject to judicial or legislative clarifi
cation.
In atteEJpting to provide a definition for the term "subordinate
personnel," it I!lust be kept in I!lind that the tern appears in an
amendment to the Resign-to-Run Law and, therefore, that it must
be defined within the parameters of the law of which it is a
part. Thus, while it could be said that a subordinate personnel
is any eI!lolovee who is subject to the authority of another, such
a definition would be inappropriate when viewed in light of the
Resign-to-Run Law because that law relates only to officers and
does not apply to mere emplovees .1 Consequently, a ''subordinate
personnel" must be an officer ,;vho otherwise would be required
by the terms of the Resign-to-Run Law to resign fror.1 his current
office when seeking to be elected to another. Such a meaning
comports with the amendment's title, which states that it
"
"exempt[s] certain persons from the requirement to resign. .
The only persons capable of being exempted are those already
1The distinction between an officer and an employee is an
important one. Generally speaking, an officer is one to whom some
portion of the sovereign power has been delegated while an employee
has not been delegated any part of the sovereign power. See, e.Q:.,
State v. Sheats, 83 So. 503 (Fla. 1919); State ex rel. \7iblJS v.
:-1artens, 193 So. 835 (Fla. 1940); Pace v. King,38 So. 2d 823 (Fla.
1949); and AGQ077-31 and the cases and opinions cited therein .
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required to resign--that is, officers seeking election to other
offices, the terms of which run concurrently with or overlap the
terms of the office they currently hold.
The term "subordinate personnel" implies tha:: t:he officer referred
to is in a position subordinate to that of another, or that he
is in a position which is subject to the control and supervision
of another person who is his superior. The Resign-to-Run Law
applies to two classes of officers--elected and appointed. An
elected officer, of course, is responsible only to those who have
elected him and, in my opinion, coµld not be considered subordinate
in any but the loosest sense. It would seem, therefore, that an
elected officer is not a "subordinate personnel" within the mean
ing of Ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida. Appointed officers, on the
other hand, may be considered to be subordinate personnel if they
are subject to the control and suDervision of another and are not
acting indepe!1dently pursuant to their own power. Whether a
particular appointed officer is a "subordinate personnel" would
have to be deten:1ined on the basis of an analysis of the statu
tory provision confe:c-ring his 'pmJer. Beyond these basic considerations , J.-CE:..D:D..9t-s-ay___w1:1a.t_the..._L.e.g-i-s-l-a-t-u-re-- intended. when__i t____p]:"oyj,_d_e_d_
_sh-t�___ej;_�_mp t_ion _frorn the Resign :-- to-Run requirements_ for _ su1J�r_dL:i_2.J:e
personnel.
QUI:STIOtJS THO i\ND THREE
Both your second and third questions concern the applicability
of Ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida, to a public school teacher who
seeks to beco□e a candidate for the district school board or for
school superintendent. As I stated in the discussion to Question
One, the 1979 a□end0ent to §99.012, F.S., does not apply to anyone
who would not othenvise have to resign under either subsection
(2) or (3) of that section.
Since those subsections require only
elected or appointed officers to resign, the amendment goes nb
further. ro rny knowledge, public school teachers have never been
held to be officers subject to the Resign-to-Run Law. See DE
077-28 (DeceMber 2, 1978), in uhich your office stated that a
public school teacher is not a public officer within the meaning
of the Resign-to-Run Law. Consequently, neither the Resign-to
Run Law nor its 1979 amenclrnent9.-pplies to public sch_ool teacbers_,
Public school teachers -wfshing t-□- -quaTify fc:h·-· public office should
be cautioned, however, that the _12_ersonn_eL_r_ule_s_____o_f _th_�_ J9_cal_
school district must be consulted for any relevant local require�
fiii:frit:s-;---·cJ. §104.31(1), (3), F.S.; §110.092(4), F.S.; Fla. Adr.1in.
Code Rule6C-5.15.
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QUESTION FOUR

In your final inquiry, you ask when the leave of absence without
pay which certain officers are required to take by the provisions
of Ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida, should coIT1Db-1c2. Again, I must
note that the tenn used in the statute--"during the period in
which he is seeking election to public office"--is not defined
in the law itself. Consequently, I cannot give a conclusive
answer, and my opinion is subject to both judicial and legislative
clarification. I must also note that this last clause in which
the proviso language relating to the leave of absence is located
was added by aoendment just before the bill was passed by the
House. The title of the bill ,vas neve:c amended to reflect this
last-L!l.inut=e ch2nge. See House Journal, p. 663 (Ma�.r 22, 1979).
As you pointed out in your letter, §97.021(18), F.S., defines
"candidate" for purposes of the election code. Your question is
whether an officer who takes a leave of absence must begin that
leave of absence when he becomes a "candidate" pursuant to
§97.021(18), or whether the leave of absence should cor.1IT1.ence only
after an officer qualifies as a candidate pursuant to Ch. 99,
F.S. Chapter 79-391 is an amendo�nt to the Resign-to-Run Law.
It provides an exeoption to certain officers who otherwise would
be required by that law to resign their office in order to
qualifv for another. See, e.g., the operative subsections (1),
(2) and (6) of §99.012, F.S., which begin, "No individual may
qualify as a candidate . .
(e. s.) Since Ch. 79-391 is an
afilendment to the Resign-to-Run Law, and because it provides
an exemption therefro0 for designated officers, its application
should be no broader than th2t of the law itself. Consequently,
it is my opinion that a subordinate personnel, deputy sheriff,
or a police officer who takes a leave of absence without pay
should beg.in his leave_Qu._tb...f da�_QD__y_hi_s_h__bg____ffil�J.ifies for ,
another offi� ➔ - the tenn of which overlaps or runs concurrently
w1-Lri:-TnaE·or the office he currently holds.
11

In sw:TII1ary, until judicially or legislatively deteTI!l.ined other
wise , I aTll of the opinion that the tem "_subordinate 2._ersonnel"
as used in Ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida, refers to an__arrnoint�...d.
officer who is under__j;:JJe __cont!
_ 2-1. and supervisi_Q_Il ___ q_f _c1r:i.o. th.e.r__
who is--his supefiol;:�;_ that neither the Resign-to-Run Law nor its
l'J79 ar:1.endment applies to a schoo1 teacher who seeks to qualify
as a candidate for either the district school board or school
superintendent; and that the leaves of absence without pay which
certain officers are required to take under the provisions of
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Ch. 79-391 should begin on the day they qualify for election to
other offices, the teIT.1s of which run concurrently with or over
lap the terms of the offices the currently hold.
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July 17, 1979

The Honorable Sam Bell
Florida House of Representatives
P.O. Box 191
Daytona Beach, Florida 32015
Re:

Resi�n-to-run

Dear Sam:
This is in response to your recent inquiry as to any applicable
resign-to-run requirements to an employee of the City of Daytona
Beach. While the state statute is not applicable, the city's civil
service law does mandate resignation, subject to exception.
Florida's resign-to-run statute (s. 99.012, Fla. Stat.) was
originally enacted in 1970, primarily to avoid the cost of special
elections to fill vacancies in office created by the officeholder's
election to higher office. A second legislatively stated purpose
was to prevent an incumbent from misusing his office in or subse
quent to the campaign. The statute is limited in its application to
"officers" at all levels of government within the state whose term
of office overlaps with that of the office being sought. Clearly
applicable to elected officers, judicial decisions have also found
it to apply to police officers. Reynolds v. SingletQn, 2d Cir. Fla.
(1978).
To statutorily overrule the Reynolds decision, the 1979 Legisla
ture enacted HB 1297 (ch. 79-391, Laws of Fla.). This bill provides
a partial exemption for law enforcement officers. Language referring
to "subordinate personnel" has created some confusion. For your
information, please see the enclosed copy of my letter of June 21,
1979, to Rep. Patchett explaining the bill's application. The law
was not expanded to include municipal employees.
However, municipalities possess the power pursuant to ch. 166,
Fla. Stat. to regulate their employees, normally through establish
ment of a civil service program. The City of Daytona Beach has done
so through the enactment of sub-part B of its charter laws. (Enacted
as Ord. No. 74-268 on September 18, 1974, and approved by the voters
on November 5, 1974.)

2

This sub-part establishes a comprehensive civil service system
regulating the hiring, promotion, tenure, and activities of city
employees. Section 33 is directly on point to your inquiry.
It
regulates the political activities of employees, particularly when
a candidate for elective office. A copy of this section is enclosed.
Your attention is directed to paragraphs (2) and (3) of sub
section (a). A city employee seeking election to a public office
other than Daytona Beach city commissioner (e.g. state legislator)
must take a leave of absence upon qualifying as a candidate.
Whether this leave of absence is with or without pay is not stated.
If elected to a public office, the employee must resign his position
unless he has obtained prior approval from the city-commission to
retain it.
I hope this answers your question.
service, please contact me.

If I can be of further

Sincerely,

fj���

A

David E. Cardwell
Staff Director
DEC/rh
Enclosures

Edward J. Healey

Chairman

David L. Barrett

Vice Chairman

· September 24, 1979
M E M O R A N D U M
TO:

Committee on Ethics

FROM:

David E. Cardwell=--i--�c=---

RE:

1979 Resign-to-Run Amendment

&

Elections

For your information, please find attached a copy of a recent
opinion by the Attorney General (AGO 079-81, September 11, 1979)
interpreting the meaning of ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida, which amended
the resign-to-run law .. s. 99.012, F.S. As you may recall this law
originated as HB 1298 by Rep. Reynolds and sought to exempt law enforce
ment officers from the resign-to-run law. The bill was extensively
debated and amended on the House floor.
The opinion is self-explanatory in explaining the application of
the new language. You might be interested to know that the AG's
office requested certain information from the committee office and the
opinion has followed much that was included in the staff report pre
pared at. the time the floor amendments were adopted with which the
bill's and amendment's sponsors agreed.
DEC/rh
Enc:
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A bill to be entitled
2

An act relating to campaigns; amending s.

3

99.012(2), Florida Statutes, defining

4

"appointive office" for provisions prohibiting

5

certain elected or appointed officeholders from

6

seeking candidate qualification unless they
resign their current office; providing an

8

@@�v
teproduced by
f:LORI A STATE ARCHIVES
DEP/ RTMENT OF STATE
R.
GRAY BUILDING
e Fl 3239iJ

Serles ---- Carton

effective date.

9

101 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
11
12

Section 1.

Subsection (2) of section 99.012, Florida

13 I Statutes, is amended to read:
14

99.012

Restrictions on individuals qualifying for

151 public office.-16

(2)

No individual may qualify as a candidate for

171 public office who holds another elective or appointive office,
181 whether state, county or municipal, the term of which or any
191 part thereof runs concurrently with the term of office for
WI which he seeks to qualify without resigning from such office
211

not less than 10 days prior to the first day of qualifying for

221 the office he intends to seek. Said resignation shall be
231 effective not later than the date upon which he would assume
UI office, if elected to the office to which he seeks to qualify,
251 the expiration date of the term of the office which he
261 presently holds, or the general election day at which his
271 successor is elected, whichever occurs earliest.

For the

nl purposes of this sec!ion the term "appointive office" shall be
�I limited to directors of state, county, or municipal agencies,
301 and shall not include subordinate personnel, deputy sheriffs
311

or police officers or any individual whose term of employment
1
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3-1564-9
is governed by a public employee labo_r- _agreement.

With

21 regard to elective offices, said resignation shall create a
31 vacancy in said office thereby permitting persons to qualify
41 as candidates for nomination and election to that office in
51 the same manner as if the term of such public officer were
61 otherwise scheduled to expire; or, in regard to elective
71 municipal or home rule charter county offices, said
81 resignation shall create a vacancy which may be filled for the
91 unexpired term of the resigned officer in such manner as
101

provided in the municipal or county charter. This does not

11 I apply to political party offices.
12

Section 2.

This act shall take effect October 1, 1979.

13
14

*****************************************

15

HOUSE SUMMARY

16
17
18
19
20

With respect to provisions prohibiting an elected or
appointed official from seeking candidate qualification
for an office without resigning his present office,
limits the term "appointive office" to directors of
state, county or municipal agencies. Specifies that the
term shall not apply to subordinate personnel, deputy
sheriffs, police officers or individuals governed by a
public employee labor agreement.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29
31
30 I

2
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SB 973 by Sen. Barron
SEE UPDATED ANALYSIS

Campaigns

I.

SUMMARY:
A. Present Situation:
Section 99.012, F.S., commonly referred to as the resign-to-run
law, requires all public officers, elective or appointive, who
seek to qualify for nomination or election to a public office, to
resign 10 days prior to the first day of qualifying if the term
of office which the official seeks runs concurrently with the
term of office he is presently holding.
This law has been interpreted to apply to deputy sheriffs and
municipal law enforcement officers. Members of advisory councils
appointed by the Governor, acting in a purely advisory capacity,
are not, however, covered by this law.
B. Effect of Proposed Changes:
This bill limits the application of the resign-to-run law to those
positions identified in the bill as "appointive offices." An
appointive office is limited by the provisions of this bill to
directors of state, county, or municipal agencies, and does not
include subordinate personnel, deputy sheriffs, police officers,
or any individual whose term of employment is governed by a
public employee labor agreement.

II. ECONOMIC IMPACT AND FISCAL NOTE:

None.

I I I. COMMENTS:
An identical bill, HB 1297, has passed the House Committee on Ethics and
Elections and has been placed on the House Calendar.
IV. AMENDMENTS:

None.

ll/\rl:: May 31, 1979

(revised)
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SUBJECT:

BILL No. AND SPONSOR:

SB 973 by Sen. Barron

Campaigns

I. SUMMARY:
A. Present Situation:
Section 99.012, F.S., commonly referred to as the resign-to-run
law, requires all public officers, elective or appointive, who
seek to qualify for nomination or election to a public office, to
resign 10 days prior to the first day of qualifying if the term
of office which the official seeks runs concurrently with the
term of office he is presently holding.
This law has been interpreted to apply to deputy sheriffs and
municipal law enforcement officers. Members of advisory councils
appointed by the Governor, acting in a purely advisory capacity,
are not, however, covered by this law.
B. Effect of Proposed Changes:
This bill limits the application of the resign-to-run law to those
positions identified in the bill as "appointive offices." An
appointive office is limited by the provisions of this bill to
directors of state, county, or municipal agencies, and does not
include subordinate personnel, deputy sheriffs, police officers,
or any individual whose term of employment is governed by a
public employee labor agreement.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT AND FISCAL NOTE:
I I I.

COMMENTS:

None.

This bill passed the Senate on May 17, 1979.
House Calendar May 21, 1979.

IV. AMENDMENTS:

None.

It was placed on the
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